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Since the first detection of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(H5N1) virus in geese in Guangdong, China, H5N1 viruses 
have transmitted to poultry throughout southern China. 
In late 2003 the first transmission wave spread the virus to 
multiple Southeast Asian countries. In May 2005, the second 
transmission wave of H5N1 virus westwards to Europe and 
Africa was initiated following a major outbreak in migratory 
birds at Qinghai Lake, China, while a third transmission wave has 
been initiated since mid-2005. Those viruses are now endemic 
in poultry populations in some affected regions and cause 
repeated outbreaks in poultry and increasing human infection 
cases, creating persistent pandemic concerns. Genetic data 
from systematic surveillance of H5N1 for the past seven years 
in marketing poultry, along with sequence data from outbreaks 
throughout the region, provide us with a unique opportunity 
to estimate the most recent common ancestor (MRCA) and 
postulate the dates of introduction of H5N1 variants into 
different affected countries. In this study, we estimated the time 
of emergence of those three transmission waves, based on their 
hemagglutinin genes, and compared these MRCA estimates 
with the date of detection of either human or poultry disease. 
These analyses indicated that the time interval between the 
first detection of H5N1 disease and the MRCA for the wave 1 
outbreaks, in both Vietnam and Indonesia, was 5 months. For 
the Qinghai outbreak the MRCA was estimated at three months 
prior to their first detection among migratory birds. Remarkably, 
the mean time of the MRCA for the third transmission wave 
was estimated as exactly the same day as the first virus (Dk/
FJ/1734/05) from this lineage was isolated. The early detection 
of H5N1 viruses in the second and third transmission waves, as 
compared to the first wave outbreaks in Vietnam and Indonesia, 
highlights the importance of systematic influenza surveillance 
in apparently healthy market poultry. 
Introduction
The first outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza 
(H5N1) occurred in goose populations in southern China in 
1996. Subsequently H5N1 viruses had transmitted to poultry 
throughout southern China, and have since become endemic 
in this region. In late 2003 the first transmission (Wave 1) was 
detected that had originated in southern China and spread 
to multiple Southeast Asian countries [1,2]. In May 2005, a 
second transmission (Wave 2) westwards to Europe and Africa 
was initiated following an H5N1 disease outbreak in migratory 
birds at Qinghai Lake, China [3], and a third transmission 
(Wave 3) was initiated in mid-2005 [4]. Those H5N1 viruses are 
now endemic in poultry populations in affected regions and 
cause repeated outbreaks in poultry and subsequent human 
infection cases with high mortality, increasing pandemic 
concern. Genetic data from systematic surveillance of H5N1 
for the past eight years in apparently healthy market poultry, 
along with sequence data from outbreaks throughout the 
region, provide us with a unique opportunity to estimate the 
most recent common ancestor (MRCA) and therefore postulate 
the dates of introduction of H5N1. 
Materials and Methods
To estimate the time of emergence of the three major 
transmission waves of H5N1 viruses, we analyzed the 
hemagglutinin (HA) gene of representative viruses belonging 
to the major sub-lineages of the A/goose/Guangdong (Gs/
GD)-like viruses that also included the recently sequenced 
viruses isolated from southern China from 2000-2003 [2]. We 
used the uncorrelated relaxed clock method in BEAST v1.4 
using sampling dates and skyline population coalescent priors 
[5,6]. MCMC chains were run thrice for 20 million generations 
sampling every 1,000 generations under the codon based 
SRD06 model [7]. The times of divergence were estimated with 
a discarded burn-in of approximately 10% using the program 
Tracer v1.3 [8], and utilizing optimized operator tuning values 
to increase the efficiency of sampling for subsequent runs. 
Results
The most recent common ancestors (MRCA) for the three 
transmission waves were calculated for the HA gene using the 
uncorrelated relaxed clock method (Figure 1). The MRCA for 
the Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia (VTM) lineage (Clade 1) 
was estimated at Mar/2003 (Highest Posterior Density {HPDs}, 
Dec/2002, Oct/2003), while the MRCA for the Indonesia lineage 
(Clade 2.1) was estimated at Apr/2003. (HPDs, Jan/2003, 
Aug/2003). These results indicate that Wave 1 transmission of 
H5N1 viruses from southern China to Vietnam and Indonesia 
was initiated at the same time in early 2003. The emergence 
of Wave 2 (Qinghai-like, Clade 2.2) and Wave 3 (Fujian-like, 
Clade 2.3.4) were estimated at March/2005 (HPDs, Jan/2005, 
May/2005) and Mar/2005 (HPDs, Oct/2004, Aug/2005), 
respectively, suggesting that MRCAs of the virus that caused 
an outbreak among migratory waterfowl in Qinghai Lake, 
China and the emergence of a new H5N1 variant (Fujian-like) in 
southern China occurred during the same time period in early 
2005.
Discussion
In this study, we estimated the time of emergence of the three 
transmission waves, based on the hemagglutinin (HA) gene. 
We then compared these MRCA estimates with the date of 
detection of either human or poultry disease and postulated 
an establishment time for the virus in the absence of control 
measures. These analyses indicated that the time intervals 
391
Poster Presentations: Genetic and Antigenic Evolution
Figure 1. Phylogenetic Tree of the Hemagglutinin (HA) Gene of Representative 
Viruses Belonging to the Gs/GD Lineage. The Analysis Was Based on 963 
Nucleotides of the HA1 Gene. The Divergence Times Correspond to the Mean 
Posterior Estimates. Bars Indicate 95% Confidence Intervals for the Divergence 
Estimates. Tip Dates Correspond to the Date of Isolation. 
 
 
Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene of representative viruses belonging to the Gs/GD lineage. The analysis was based on 963 nucleotides 
of the HA1 gene. The divergence times correspond to the mean posterior estimates. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for the divergence estimates. Tip dates 
correspond to the date of isolation.
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between the first detection of H5N1 disease and the MRCA for 
the Wave 1 outbreaks in both Vietnam and Indonesia, that were 
initiated from Yunnan and Hunan provinces of southern China, 
was 5 months (Figure 2). For the Qinghai outbreak (Wave 2) the 
MRCA was estimated at 3 months prior to their first detection 
among migratory birds. Remarkably, the mean time of the 
MRCA for Wave 3 was the same day that the first virus (Dk/
FJ/1734/05) from this lineage was isolated (Figure 2). The early 
detection of H5N1 viruses in the second and third transmission 
waves, as compared to the first wave outbreaks in Vietnam and 
Indonesia, highlights the importance of systematic influenza 
surveillance in apparently healthy market poultry in the early 
detection, and potential for control, of the virus.
Figure 2. Time line of emergence of major H5N1 lineages and disease 
outbreaks in southeast Asia. Mean divergence times are shown in black; 
bars indicate 95% highest posterior density (HPD). The bars adjacent to the 
divergence estimates indicate outbreak/occurrence events. 
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Figure 2. Time Line of Emergence of Major H5N1 Lineages and Disease 
Outbreaks in Southeast Asia. Mean Divergence Times Are Shown in Black; Bars 
Indicate 95% Highest Posterior Density (HPD). The Bars Adjacent to the 
Divergence Estimates Indicate Outbreak/Occurrence Events. 
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